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 ABSTRACT 
Spatial and temporal attributes of watersheds and the associated market failures 
that accelerate degradation of agricultural and environmental resources require 
innovative institutional arrangements for coordinating use and management of 
resources. Effective collective action (CA) allows smallholder farmers to jointly 
invest in management practices that provide collective benefits in terms of 
economic and sustainability gains. The Government of India takes integrated 
watershed management (IWM) as a key strategy for improving productivity and 
livelihoods in the rain-fed and drought-prone regions. This study investigates the 
institutional and policy issues that limit effective participation of people in 
community watershed programs and identifies key determinants for the degree of 
CA and its effectiveness in achieving economic and environmental outcomes. We 
use empirical data from a survey of 87 watershed communities in semi-arid Indian 
villages to identify a set of indicators of CA and its performance in attaining desired 
outcomes. Factor analysis is used to develop aggregate indices of CA and its 
effectiveness. Regression methods are then employed to test the effects of certain 
policy relevant variables and to determine the potential effects of CA in achieving 
desired poverty reduction and resource improvement outcomes. We find a positive 
and highly significant effect of CA on natural resource investments, but no evidence 
of its effects on household assets and poverty reduction outcomes. This may be 
attributable to longer gestation periods for realizing indirect effects from collective 
natural resource investments and the lack of institutional mechanisms to ensure 
equitable distribution of such gains across the community, including the landless 
and marginal farmers.  
Keywords: collective action, institutions, property rights, watershed management, 
poverty, environmental impacts. 
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COMMUNITY WATERSHED MANAGEMENT IN SEMI-ARID 
INDIA  
 
The State of Collective Action and its Effects on Natural Resources and 
Rural Livelihoods  
 
Bekele A Shiferaw,1 Tewodros A Kebede, and V. Ratna Reddy 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Watershed management is a landscape-based strategy that aims to implement 
improved natural resource management systems for improving livelihoods and 
promoting beneficial conservation, sustainable use, and management of natural 
resources. Integrated watershed management (IWM) has been promoted in many 
countries as a suitable strategy for improving productivity and sustainable 
intensification of agriculture. The government of India, in particular, accords high 
priority to watershed programs as a strategy for integrated development of rural 
communities, especially in rain-fed and drought-prone areas. It goes beyond 
conservation technologies and emphasizes the importance of the human dimension 
and the need to integrate technological tools with broad-ranging social, political, 
and economic changes. Instead of focusing exclusively on biophysical processes 
that improve resource conditions, IWM includes multiple crop and livestock-based 
income strategies that support and diversify livelihood opportunities for the poor, 
and create synergies between targeted technologies, policies, and institutions to 
improve productivity, resource use sustainability, and market access (Kerr, 2001; 
Reddy et al., 2004a; Shiferaw et al., 2006).  
Investment in IWM requires active cooperation among stakeholders at 
different levels. Collective action occurs when individuals voluntarily cooperate as a 
group to coordinate their behavior to solve a shared problem. Collective action may 
be broadly defined as action taken by a group (either directly or on its behalf 
through an organization) in pursuit of members’ perceived shared interests 
(Marshall, 1998). Effective collective action often requires formulating and enforcing 
rules that govern and condition the members’ expectations to achieve their 
common goal. This indicates that several resource management and livelihood 
activities in rural areas manifest attributes of non-exclusion and require 
coordination of resource users’ efforts through collective action. The need for 
collective action depends on the resource type, the degree of spatial integration, 
and the time required for attaining the desired outcomes. 
Collective action tends to be more important in the context of many 
developing countries where formal institutions are missing or not functioning 
properly for the management of natural resources up on which the livelihoods of 
many poor depend. Successful communities in terms of sustainable management of 
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common pool resources are usually characterized by exhibiting well defined rules, 
the ability to monitor behavior and punish violators, the existence of mechanisms 
for conflict resolution, and forum for negotiating future courses of action (Wade, 
1988; Ostrom, 1990; Tang, 1994; Baland and Platteau, 1996; Lam, 1998). The 
ability of communities to initiate, develop, and sustain collective action often 
depends on the internal socioeconomic characteristics of the communities and the 
biophysical and socioeconomic setting. There is evidence based on comparison of 
communities for collective action in natural resource management that 
demographic characteristics and institutional and organizational structures of the 
community are related to cooperative and implementation capacity (McCarthy et 
al., 2004). Heterogeneity along the lines of ethnicity, religion, and social class is 
found to have a negative effect on cooperation. The effect of inequality in wealth 
and community size is less clear cut, although community size and inequality seem 
to reduce cooperation. Despite the increasing information on factors that deter or 
facilitate management of common property resources, there is lack of knowledge 
and information on factors that influence the level and effectiveness of collective 
action within the context of community watershed programs. This is despite the 
increased policy support for decentralized management of natural resources and 
the significant amount of investment that both governments and communities 
undertake to enhance the poverty and environmental impacts of watershed 
programs. 
In order to address some of these policy relevant issues, this study uses 
socioeconomic data from 87 watershed villages in six districts of Andhra Pradesh, 
India, develops indicators for the degree of collective action, and examines its 
potential determinants. This is followed by the analyses of key indicators for the 
effectiveness of collective action in attaining desired economic and environmental 
outcomes of watershed management. The study provides useful insights on how 
community institutions determine the level of collective action in watershed 
management and how such collective action is related to the overall performance 
and effectiveness of watershed interventions. The study concludes that collective 
action is strongly correlated with improvements in natural resource conditions, but 
there is limited evidence to link it with impacts on poverty.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two outlines the 
theoretical issues that necessitate collective action in watershed management. 
Section three presents the data and empirical methods used in the analyses of the 
survey data. Section four discusses the major findings, and the final section 
concludes by highlighting the key findings and policy implications. 
2. COLLECTIVE ACTION IN WATERSHED MANAGEMENT 
A watershed is a catchments area from which all water drains into a common point, 
making it suitable for technical efforts to manage water and soil resources. It is a 
spatially defined unit that includes diverse natural resources that are unevenly 
distributed within a given geographical area. Due to this spatial aspect of the 
watersheds, resources as well as resource users become interdependent over time 
and space. Watersheds connect different communities that are spatially separated, 
exploiting watershed resources depending on their specific position within the 
catchments. This creates interdependence in both the watershed resources and 
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user communities (for example, between those on the upper, middle, and lower 
reaches) where the actions of one group will influence the production and 
investment decisions of others (Swallow et al., 2002). The actual size of the 
watershed depends on topographic and agro-climatic conditions and may range 
from few hundred to several thousand hectares. Thus, the effectiveness of 
watershed interventions depends on the ability to treat the entire hydrological 
landscape, not just a portion of it (Knox and Gupta, 2000; Johnson et al., 2002). 
Some of the investment activities of watershed management include 
construction of check-dams for infiltrating surface water, terraces for soil and water 
conservation, and tree planting. The return to such investments is not often 
realized in a short period of time. The costs are incurred at the time of the 
investment while economic returns are often delayed and accrue in small quantities 
over a long period of time. Hence, the resource improving watershed interventions 
require a relatively larger planning horizon compared to short duration agricultural 
technologies like new varieties. Because of the problems of exclusion and the high 
initial costs, such projects that generate long term positive externalities are less 
likely to be undertaken by individual households, indicating the need for collective 
decisions among potential beneficiaries. 
Watershed management also potentially provides livelihood support for 
socially complex and diverse groups with differing entitlements and rights of access 
and use of resources. Sustainable management of such resources requires 
institutional mechanisms for fostering cooperation and coordination of the resource 
use and investment decisions among diverse stakeholders in the community. 
Effective collective management depends on the level of existing community 
organizations and social capital to ensure equitable access and utilization of 
watershed resources.  
For this study, we define collective action as decisions taken by a group to 
internalize negative externalities and/or to generate positive externalities in the use 
and management of watershed resources. We identify two main components of 
collective action needed for the effectiveness of watershed management 
interventions: 
• Enabling institutions: This requires the development of rules and 
regulations for operation and management of the various common assets 
and structures including grazing lands, check-dams, agro-forestry, and 
soil and water conservation practices. These rules will also include 
establishment of mechanisms for conflict resolution, regulation of 
behavior, and agreed norms for sharing costs and benefits. 
• Organizational performance: This involves the design and establishment of 
local mechanisms for coordination and implementation of watershed 
activities. This often calls for establishment of user groups, watershed 
committees and watershed associations, wherein the objectives and basic 
structure of authority and decision making are determined.  
These institutional and organizational structures of the community are critical 
for conceptualizing the need for collective behavior and facilitating the proper 
planning, designing, and execution of specific actions taken by the community 
groups at various stages of implementing the watershed project, including 
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mobilization and management of local and other resources, implementation of 
watershed activities, conflict resolutions, and maintenance of such investments. 2 
Setting up these arrangements is not without cost and may often require 
sensitizing and organizing widely dispersed resource users with diverging interests. 
However, these group activities can be used to capture the level of collective action 
in the community while the specific watershed outcomes can be measured using 
objectively verifiable investments like the number of check-dams, tube wells, tanks, 
and the like built or jointly maintained by the watershed communities. This can be 
complemented by other qualitative measures to characterize non-quantifiable 
economic and environmental benefits to the community attributable to the 
watershed development activities. 
The level of collective action therefore defines the ability of the community to 
create operational frameworks to achieve the goals pursued by the community. Our 
empirical analyses focus on measuring the level of collective action in the 
community, using multiple indicators consistent with the different facets of 
collective action in watershed management. The selected indicators for the degree 
of collective action will have several dimensions spanning the two types of group 
actions described above. Hence, the different indicators are aggregated using 
statistical methods to develop indices for the level of collective action. Our dataset 
enables us to capture the critical elements of collective action in terms of the two 
categories: (a) enabling institutions and (b) participation and organizational 
performance. The selected indicators for each of the two categories representing 
the degree of collective action are discussed later.  
Along with other factors hypothesized to influence the success of collective 
action, we investigate how the various facets of collective action determine the 
outcomes of collective action. An important initial outcome of collective action in 
watershed management is an improvement in the condition of soil, water, and 
other natural resources on both private and common lands. This first stage effect is 
captured by constructing an aggregate performance index for diverse outcomes 
defining changes in resource conditions and benefits derived from watershed 
management activities. In the second stage, collective action in watershed 
management is expected to improve the well-being of the community and the 
participants. This is the key driver of participation and private and community 
investments in watershed activities. In order to measure this effect, we use 
information solicited from communities on various indicators of poverty and welfare 
changes within the watershed. These changes are those that respondents consider 
to be primarily attributable or driven by the IWM interventions. We then test 
whether the level of collective action in fact is associated with these positive welfare 
changes within the community. The different indicators and indices are discussed in 
the next section. 
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3. DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODS 
Data 
This study is based on a large survey carried out in 87 watershed villages from a 
stratified sample of six districts of Andhra Pradesh, India. Meta analysis of 
watershed impact in India identified water availability (using rainfall as a proxy) as 
a major determinant of the success of community watershed programs (Joshi et al., 
2004a). In order to capture this effect, community watersheds were stratified into 
three categories on the basis of historical average rainfall: low rainfall (less than 
600 mm), medium rainfall (600-900 mm), and high rainfall (more than 900 mm). 
Two districts were selected from each agro-climatic zone. A proportional random 
sample of 87 community watershed villages was selected from the six districts of 
the survey. In order to assess the degree of collective action and its effects on 
poverty and natural resource conditions, watersheds were sampled from a list of 
mature watersheds where major institutional arrangements for collective action and 
community development activities have been completed. This does not, however, 
preclude the fact that communities may continue to maintain or upgrade the joint 
investments made during the project phase.  
Data were collected using standard data collection instruments at the 
community level from leaders, user groups, and key informants. The number of 
respondents in each watershed representing group leaders and selected ordinary 
members varied from 5-8 local residents (including at least one woman) as key 
informants.3 The group interviews were conducted in a transparent but informal 
setting that allowed all respondents to express views as freely as possible and 
reach consensus on many debatable issues. The key informants often knew the 
troubled user groups and self-help groups, and this was further verified during 
discussions with user and self-help groups and their members. Since the survey 
was conducted after the projects have been completed, there was no cash at stake, 
making it easier for groups to be more open in expressing their governance and 
management problems. Data collected included a range of issues that characterized 
the village and the watershed groups including demographic data (number of 
households by ethnicity, land ownership), market access, commodity and resource 
prices, social services and investment in natural resource management, process 
and evolution of collective action, and various indicators of the level and 
effectiveness of collective action including distribution of economic and 
environmental benefits from watershed management activities. The summary 
statistics of selected variables is given in Table 1.  
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Table 1. Summary statistics of selected variables in the sample (n=87 
watersheds) 
Variables  Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Household (hh) and social characteristics     
Total number of households 380.89 270.18 76.00 1280.00 
Number of castes in village 10.41 5.01 1.00 22.00 
Social (caste) diversity index  0.49 0.17 0.00 0.73 
Share of forward caste 0.15 0.18 0.0 0.87 
Share of backward caste 0.44 0.26 0.0 1 
Share of scheduled caste 0.25 0.18 0.0 1 
Share of scheduled tribe 0.16 0.28 0.0 1 
Number of seasonal migrants before project  13.51 17.06 0.00 75.00 
Number of permanent migrants before project 4.38 7.31 0.00 52.00 
Share of marginal and landless  0.32 0.20 0.00 0.97 
Watershed project characteristics     
Age of watershed project  5.19 1.02 3.00 8.00 
Area of watershed village (acre) 2603.38 1815.78 990.0 10380.0 
Project implementing agency (NGO=1) 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Assets     
Percentage of hhs owning open wells before 
project 
22.16 27.66 0.00 170 
Percentage of hhs owning open wells after project 20.05 25.75 0.00 170 
Percentage of hhs owning tube wells before 
project 
14.81 19.98 0.00 83.00 
Percentage of hhs owning tube wells after project 21.72 22.88 0.00 95.00 
Cattle owner households before project (%) 55.00 18.01 20.00 100.00 
Infrastructure and markets     
Distance to nearest market (km) 14.83 11.81 3.00 70.00 
Distance to mandal (km) 10.83 8.78 1.00 71.00 
Distance to Hyderabad (km) 225.67 119.08 30.00 422.00 
Quality of road to village (1=poor to 4=very 
good) 
2.95 0.43 1.00 4.00 
Highest school standard in village 6.62 2.23 0.00 10.00 
Number of schools in village 1.49 0.93 1.00 5.00 
Number of clinics  0.44 0.80 0.00 4.00 
Number of phones per hh before project 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.18 
Number of phones per hh after project 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.59 
Percentage of hhs with electricity before project 54.06 29.92 7.15 100.00 
Percentage of hhs with electricity after project 65.86 35.54 8.16 100.00 
Biophysical conditions     
Medium rainfall zone (dummy) 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 
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High rainfall zone (dummy) 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Share of cultivated area rain-fed  0.89 0.13 0.35 1.00 
Share of total area degraded  0.01 0.01 0.00 0.06 
Share of CPR and forest area  0.10 0.14 0.00 0.67 
Leadership and conflict management     
Acceptability of leader (yes=1) 0.90 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Popularity of leader (1=low to 3=high) 2.07 0.33 1.00 3.00 
Leadership problem (1= low to 5=high) 1.91 0.39 1.00 3.00 
Problems in transparency of using funds (5=high) 2.44 0.60 1.00 4.00 
Problems in conflict management (1= low to 
5=high) 2.43 0.74 1.00 5.00 
Read previous minutes at each meeting (yes=1) 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Share information widely (yes=1) 0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Preferred employment for women (yes=1) 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 
Empirical methods 
Several variables are identified to capture the degree and success of collective 
action in watershed management. However, the large number of indicators for the 
level and success of collective action can be reduced, using statistical data 
reduction methods, to a few indices that capture most of the information in these 
variables. We employ factor analysis to develop an aggregate index of the degree 
and success of collective action specific to each watershed community and to 
identify the relative importance of the selected indicators. Factor analysis allows 
clustering of variables on the basis of mutual correlations and a grouping of 
variables based on their similarities. The higher the loading of a variable, the more 
influence it has on the formation of the factor scores and vice versa. This is followed 
by regression analyses to identify the determinants of level and success of 
collective action in watershed management. The advantage of using factor score is 
that the new variables are not correlated and the problem of multicollinearity is 
avoided (Sharma, 1996:79-81). The resulting factor structure represents a distinct 
construct that can be meaningfully interpreted (Sharma, 1996:119). The ability to 
interpret and assign some meaning to the factors acts as an extremely important 
criterion in determining the final number of factors to extract (Frankfort-Nachmias 
and Nachmias, 1996). 
Level of collective action 
We consider two sets of variables that capture the level of collective action in 
watershed management activities: (a) enabling institutions and (b) participation 
and organizational performance. Development of institutions for defining and 
regulating individual behavior and shaping expectations is a critical first step and 
enabling condition for community watershed management. This is an important 
indicator of collective action in terms of creating the enabling conditions for 
community management. We use several proxy variables to capture the level of 
collective action in terms of establishing the ground rules for co-operation, including 
rules designed and adopted by the watershed community to address the different 
dimensions of collective natural resource management, the percentage of 
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watershed association (WA) members respecting rules for cash contribution, and 
the percentage of WA members respecting rules for labor contribution. Participation 
of households in various joint community activities including attendance of 
meetings and fund-raising events is also decisive for the level of collective action. 
Community members show their commitment to collective principles through their 
labor and cash contributions, which can be considered as key indicators for the 
degree of collective action in a given community. In this category we included 
average amount of cash contributions per household, community’s share of cash 
contribution, labor contributions, average amount of maintenance funds contributed 
per household and the number of households contributing to the maintenance fund. 
To indicate organizational performance, we use the proportion of smoothly running 
user groups (UGs), proportion of smoothly running self help groups (SHGs), 
number of watershed committee (WC) meetings per year, percentage of members 
attending WC meetings, and watershed association (WA) meetings per year. These 
variables capture the broader dimensions of the level or degree of collective action 
in community watershed management.  
Success of collective action 
We use a mix of quantitative and qualitative indicators to measure the effectiveness 
or success of collective action in watershed management in terms of achieving 
various community objectives. In the first instance, we capture the outcomes of 
collective action in undertaking natural resource improving investments. We identify 
eight different variables as indicators for the community’s achievements in 
improving the natural resource base in the watershed. These include the total 
number of improved or well-managed communal tube (drill) wells, open wells, 
check-dams, ponds, tanks, area of community forests, and share of communal and 
private land treated with collective conservation practices. In the second level of 
the analysis, we identify certain indicators that measure the changes in the level of 
asset endowments or poverty profiles in the surveyed communities. We use seven 
indicators to capture these changes including increases in the number of 
households owning livestock and land, self-sufficient in food staples, overall food 
security, income growth to escape poverty as well as the reduction in the number of 
households involved in seasonal and permanent out-migration. 
Econometric estimation 
In both cases, the indices that are obtained from the factor analyses are 
investigated further to identify their key determinants using regression analyses. 
The first set of equations estimated examines the likely determinants of the 
variation in the degree of collective action across the surveyed watershed 
communities. The parameters for the determinants of the levels of collective action 
are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). The following general equation is 
estimated. 
 
(1) εβ +′=− XIndexCA  
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where CA-Index is a measure of the level of collective action, X is a vector of 
exogenous explanatory variables,β  is parameters to be estimated, and ε  is an 
error term that is normally distributed with zero mean and variance 
2σ . 
The second set of equations estimated attempts to identify the variables that 
affect the performance or effectiveness of watershed activities. Along with several 
community characteristics and biophysical and socioeconomic factors, we 
particularly test whether the indices measuring the degree of collective action 
identified above will have any effect on the two indices measuring the success or 
effectiveness of community watershed investments. This helps to assess whether 
collective action expressed through joint watershed investments has generated 
joint public goods that offer benefits and create incentives for conservation of 
community watersheds. The following generic equation is used for estimation of the 
performance of collective action: 
 
(2) εββ ++′=− 2211 XXindexPerf  
 
where Perf-index is the dependent variable measuring the index of the 
performance of collective action, X1 is a vector of exogenous regressors, X2 is a 
vector of indices of collective action used to capture the enabling institutions and 
organizational performance, β s are estimated parameters, and ε is an error term 
that is normally distributed with zero mean and variance 2σ . 
Using OLS for estimation of the performance of collective action may, 
however, lead to inconsistent estimates if unobserved variables affect both the level 
of collective action and the performance of collective action, leading to endogeneity 
bias (Wooldridge, 2002). In order to test this effect, we first estimate the full 
regression model for the performance equations and test for joint significance of 
selected variables. Those variables that were found to be jointly insignificant were 
then excluded from the performance regressions, and some of them are used as 
instruments for estimating the potentially endogenous variables (indices of the level 
of collective action). We also test for the validity of the instruments using standard 
tests for over-identifying restrictions (Baum et al., 2003) and use the Hausman test 
(Hausman, 1978) to evaluate the consistency of OLS compared to the two-stage 
instrumental variables approach. The analysis is undertaken using the IVREG2 
procedure in STATA Version 10 (Baum et al., 2007). 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Socioeconomic characteristics of communities 
Socioeconomic characteristics of the 87 sample watershed communities are given in 
Table 1 to facilitate a better understanding of the context. As indicated earlier, the 
watershed communities are chosen to represent the three rainfall zones: low, 
medium, and high. The sample watersheds are chosen from these three zones and 
evenly distributed among the zones. About 48 percent of the watersheds are 
implemented by various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working with the 
communities. While previous studies indicate that projects implemented by NGOs 
were generally more successful (Kerr, 2001), the second-generation watershed 
 
 
10 
programs implemented by government agencies also pursued participatory 
approaches. Some NGOs also lack capacity and/or reputation for mobilizing local 
communities and managing available project funds. The implementing agency (PIA) 
is not therefore expected to have any significant effect on the effectiveness of 
watershed projects included in this study. The important roles of the PIA are to 
facilitate community organization and training, motivate the formulation of local 
rules for collective action and resource mobilization, and design and facilitate 
implementation of development plans for the watershed. The projects were funded 
by various governmental (e.g., Drought Prone Area Program (DPAP), Desert 
Development Program (DDP), Integrated Watershed Development Projects (IWDP)) 
facilitated through national and state governments and non-governmental 
organizations. 
Since the survey included only completed watersheds, the average duration 
of watershed projects is about 5.16 years. The average size of the communities 
varied both in terms of the size of the community members and the geographical 
areas covered. The average size of the groups is about 380 households but varied 
between 76 and 1280 households. The average size of the watershed villages is 
about 2600 acres (1054 hectares), but this ranged between 400 and 4200 ha 
showing wide disparities in the geographical areas covered by the projects. As is 
typical of rural India, the communities are composed of diverse social groups 
representing different castes. The number of social groups varied between 5 and 22 
castes with an average number of 10 castes. Using the conventional caste 
classification systems used in India, about 15 percent of the villagers belonged to 
the forward, 44 percent to the backward, 25 percent to the scheduled castes, and 
the remaining 16 percent to the scheduled tribes.  
The communities also varied in terms of infrastructure and market access 
variables. The distance to the nearest market varied between 3 and 70 km with an 
average of about 15 km. The distance to the State capital, Hyderabad, varied from 
30 to over 420 km, with an average of 119 km. Similarly, the quality of the roads 
to the village varied significantly from good to very bad condition. The proportion of 
households owning certain assets like tube wells, livestock, etc and having access 
to electricity and telephones also varied among the surveyed villages. On average, 
there are 1.5 schools and 0.44 clinics in these watershed communities. About 55 
percent of the households own cattle. Data was also collected on how asset 
ownership and access to social infrastructure varied before and after the project. 
For example, ownership of tube wells increased from about 15 percent before the 
project to about 22 percent after the project. However, the number of phones per 
household changed from 0.02 to 0.07, and the share of households with access to 
electricity grew from 54 percent to about 66 percent. These factors are taken into 
account in evaluating the likely determinants and impacts of collective action on 
watershed management. 
Indicators for level of collective action  
In this section, we discuss the results from analyses of indicators for collective 
action. As a preliminary validation step for the selected indicators, a simple pair-
wise correlation between the 13 indicators is conducted (Table 2). The pair-wise 
correlations are significant at 10 percent for most of the variables and hence 
validate the use of factor analysis. The result of the factor analysis gives two useful 
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factors with Eigen values greater than one, and we present the scoring coefficients 
for these factors in Table 3. 
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Table 2. Correlation matrix between 13 indicators of level of collective 
action 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11  12 13  
1              1– Community’s share of total watershed 
development investment  
2 +             2 – Average household cash contribution 
toward investment fund 
3 + +            3 – Average household contributions towards 
maintenance funds  
4  + -           4 – Households contributing to maintenance 
fund 
5  +  +          5 – Labor contribution per household 
6  +            6 – Percentage of smoothly running UGs 
7  -   - -        7 – Percentage of smoothly running SHGs 
8 +  +  +         8 – WA meetings per year 
9   -           9 – WC meetings per year 
10      +  - +     10 – Percentage of members attending WC 
meetings 
11 -  - +  + - - + +    11 – Percentage of WA members respecting 
rules for cash contribution 
12   - +  + -   + +   12 – Percentage of WA members respecting 
rules for labor contribution 
13    + + + -  + + + +  13 – The dimension of NRM covered by rules 
(bylaws) 
The scoring coefficients for the first factor are relatively high for variables 
related to local institutions (rules and bylaws) defining the rules of the game and 
shaping expectations of the participants. The scoring coefficients are particularly 
higher for the bylaws developed to strengthen local institutions of collective action, 
to address the specific uses and management of diverse resource types (community 
woodlots, check-dams, grazing, and so on) in the watershed, and the share of 
community members respecting the different rules, especially those related to cash 
and labor contributions. The first factor therefore is considered to capture the effect 
of ‘enabling institutions’ for community collective action and participation. We call 
this the internal institutional capacity (IIC—see Figure 1) of the community. The 
second factor gets most of its loadings from variables that show the degree of 
household participation in collective activities and their contributions towards 
watershed activities. These include both cash and labor contributions for project 
activities and for sustainability of project investments during the post-project 
period. Accordingly, we consider this factor to capture mainly the effect of 
participation and organizational performance that may be called internal 
mobilization capacity (IMC—see Figure 2) of the community.  
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Table 3. Scoring coefficients for two retained factors for level of collective 
action 
Variables Institutional 
Capacity 
Mobilization 
Capacity 
Community’s share of cash contribution -0.02951 0.10651 
Per capita cash contribution 0.11568 0.46995 
Cash contributions per household towards post-project 
sustainability -0.08321 0.14667 
Households contributing to investment maintenance fund 0.13313 0.13412 
Labor contribution per household 0.02274 0.21983 
Percentage of smoothly running UGs 0.14548 -0.03217 
Percentage of smoothly running SHGs -0.06003 -0.07277 
WA meetings per year -0.01354 0.17142 
WC meetings per year 0.03762 -0.04319 
Percentage of members attending WC meetings 0.11389 -0.12508 
Percentage of WA members respecting rules for cash contribution 0.22828 -0.14813 
Percentage of WA members respecting rules for labor 
contribution 0.24391 -0.03521 
Dimension of institutions and NRM covered by bylaws 0.27820 0.04326 
Eigen values 2.85 1.46 
 
The factor analysis therefore provides two indices, capturing internal 
institutional capacity and internal mobilization capacity. In order to see the degree 
of variation across watershed communities in terms of these two measures of 
collective action, we plot these indices in Figures 1 and 2. These results show that 
watersheds vary significantly in terms of the degree of observed collective action, 
but the distributions for the two indices are quite different. Whereas the IIC shows 
that about 55 percent have values above zero (skewed to the right), the scores for 
IMC show that more than 60 percent of the watersheds have values below zero 
(skewed to the left). While the individual scores are difficult to interpret on their 
own, their relative values can shed light on the relative position of any given 
watershed community on the scale of the degree of collective action. Both indices 
show that watersheds with significantly higher scores (e.g., >1.0) are relatively 
fewer. The majority of the watersheds (about 60 percent) have values close to zero 
or slightly higher (± 0.5). About 8-10 percent of the sample watersheds have 
higher scores on both indices (>1.0). This clearly indicates that the level of active 
collective action in terms of establishing and enforcing collective rules and 
mobilizing community resources for joint investments is generally low in many of 
the watersheds. This is consistent with similar findings of low levels of effective 
community participation in watershed programs across India (Joshi et al., 2004b; 
Reddy et al., 2004a). 
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Figure 1. Percentage distribution of index of institutional capacity (IIC) 
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Figure 2. Percentage distribution of index of mobilization capacity (IMC) 
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Table 4. Regression results for index of institutional capacity (IIC)4 
Variables Coefficients Std. Err. t-statistics P-Value 
Project implementing agency (NGO=1) 0.005 0.217 0.02 0.983 
Age of watershed -0.082 0.110 -0.74 0.460 
Village area (acre) -0.001 0.001 -2.17** 0.034 
Medium rainfall dummy 0.483 0.477 1.01 0.315 
High rainfall zone dummy 0.720 0.285 2.53** 0.014 
Distance to Hyderabad 0.002 0.002 1.07 0.287 
Distance to mandal -0.020 0.011 -1.83* 0.072 
Distance to market 0.025 0.008 2.97*** 0.004 
Number of households -0.005 0.002 -3.03*** 0.004 
Square of number of households 0.001 0.001 3.05*** 0.003 
Number of castes 0.092 0.033 2.79*** 0.007 
Caste heterogeneity index -0.557 0.623 -0.89 0.375 
Proportion of marginal & landless householdsa -0.105 0.562 -0.19 0.852 
Number of seasonally migrating householdsa 0.004 0.006 0.66 0.514 
Number of permanently migrating 
householdsa 
-0.016 0.013 -1.22 0.226 
Highest school standard -0.044 0.058 -0.75 0.456 
Number of schools -0.189 0.143 -1.32 0.191 
Households with phonesa 0.010 0.006 1.69* 0.096 
Households with electricitya -0.002 0.001 -2.03** 0.047 
Transparency of funding 0.198 0.174 1.14 0.258 
Leader’s acceptability 0.572 0.375 1.53 0.132 
Information dissemination 0.219 0.255 0.86 0.394 
Preference for female employment 0.897 0.463 1.94* 0.058 
Proportion of waste land -36.491 21.369 -1.71* 0.093 
Proportion of rain-fed land -0.265 0.873 -0.3 0.762 
Proportion of CPR and forest -0.824 0.753 -1.1 0.278 
Constant 0.609 1.723 0.35 0.725 
Number of observations 84    
R2 0.60    
 
                                                     
 
4 *, **, *** signify significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. 
a Refers to before project conditions. 
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Determinants of the level of collective action 
In this section we discuss results from the analyses of the determinants of indices 
of the degree of collective action. In order to identify the key variables associated 
with higher levels of community collective action, we included several variables that 
capture the: 
• biophysical conditions (rainfall zone, village area, share of rain-fed 
farmland, share of degraded land, community forest, and other commons, 
and so on);  
• socio-economic profile of the village (distance to markets and local 
administration, number of schools, ownership of selected assets like 
phones and wells);  
• type of implementing agency (NGO or government); 
• socio-economic characteristics of the groups (size, number of castes, and 
diversity of social groups);  
• leadership and organizational attributes of the groups (transparency in 
management of finances, quality of leadership, role of women, and so 
on). 
Table 5. Regression result for index of mobilization capacity (IMC)5 
Variables Coefficients Std. Err. t-statistics P-Value 
Project implementing agency (NGO=1) 0.086 0.160 0.54 0.594 
Age of watershed 0.053 0.081 0.65 0.519 
Village area (acre) 0.000 0.000 2.49** 0.016 
Medium rainfall dummy -0.772 0.352 -2.19** 0.032 
High rainfall zone dummy -0.859 0.210 -4.1*** 0.000 
Distance to Hyderabad -0.002 0.001 -1.51 0.137 
Distance to mandal -0.028 0.008 -3.4*** 0.001 
Distance to market 0.009 0.006 1.4 0.167 
Number of households -0.006 0.001 -5.26*** 0.000 
Square of number of households 0.000 0.000 2.88*** 0.006 
Number of castes -0.022 0.024 -0.91 0.369 
Caste heterogeneity index 0.050 0.459 0.11 0.913 
Proportion of marginal & landless householdsa 0.320 0.414 0.77 0.443 
Number of seasonally migrating householdsa -0.009 0.004 -2.1** 0.040 
Number of permanently migrating householdsa 0.006 0.010 0.64 0.525 
Highest school standard 0.075 0.043 1.73* 0.089 
Number of schools 0.093 0.105 0.88 0.383 
Households with phonesa -0.001 0.004 -0.19 0.850 
Households with electricitya 0.000 0.001 -0.38 0.706 
Transparency of funding -0.001 0.128 -0.01 0.994 
                                                     
 
5 *, **, *** signify significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
 
18 
Leader’s acceptability -0.289 0.276 -1.05 0.300 
Information dissemination 0.419 0.188 2.22** 0.030 
Preference for female employment 1.024 0.341 3.00*** 0.004 
Proportion of waste land 23.358 15.754 1.48 0.144 
Proportion of rain-fed land -0.717 0.644 -1.11 0.270 
Proportion of CPR and forest 1.170 0.555 2.11** 0.039 
Constant 2.254 1.270 1.77* 0.081 
Number of Observations 84    
R2 0.742    
a Refers to before project conditions. 
 
The regression results for the two indices are presented in Tables 4 and 5. 
The major positive correlates with institutional capacity include high rainfall, 
distance to the nearest main market, number of castes, number of phones, and 
agreed preferences for offering priority for female employment in watershed works 
in the community. The negative correlates with institutional capacity include the 
geographical size of the village, the number of households, distance to mandal 
(local administration), the proportion of households with electricity, and the 
proportion of degraded land in the community. The positive effect of distance to 
markets and the negative effect of access to electricity seem to indicate that the 
internal institutional capacity somehow decreases with market access and 
urbanization. Better market access seems to stimulate more integration with the 
economy outside the village, and so people may be more focused on that and less 
interested in participating in village institutions. On the other hand, better water 
management and access to irrigation resulting from collective watershed 
management may also strengthen market orientation through production of high 
value irrigated crops such as vegetables. The exact influence of these factors on 
collective action is not immediately clear and may warrant more investigations in 
the future. The negative effect of size of the village and number of households 
indicate the transaction costs and coordination problems associated with large 
groups. However, the second term for group size was positive, indicating a 
relationship that differs from the common inverted U type of response for this 
variable. But these results are consistent with findings in the West African Sahel 
(McCarthy et al., 2004). The negative effect of the proportion of degraded land on 
institutional capacity shows that villages with a higher proportion of village land 
under degraded categories may find it difficult to establish rules and bylaws for 
proper management of these resources. 
With regard to the determinants of the second index for level of collective 
action, the positive correlates with the internal mobilization capacity include the 
size of the village, the level of education in the village (proxied through the highest 
school standard), the level of information flow about community activities (proxied 
through communication of work plans and decisions using the village notice board), 
the proportion of common lands and community forests in the village area, and the 
preference for female employment in watershed works. The negative correlates 
include the location of the village within the medium and higher rainfall zones in the 
semi-arid region, the size of the group (number of households), distance to the 
local administration (mandal), and number of seasonal migrants from the village. 
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Except for the two variables - rainfall and village area - most of the other variables 
have similar effects for the two indices of collective action (see Table 5). While 
institutional capacity seemed to be higher in the medium and high rainfall areas, 
mobilization capacity of the communities seems to be lower in these same areas, 
indicating that the overall effect of rainfall may depend on the relative magnitude of 
these seemingly opposing effects. Similarly, the share of village degraded land 
seemed to have a positive (but not significant) effect on mobilization capacity, 
indicating that if communities are able to evolve the fundamental rules of the game 
(institutions), the capacity for mobilizing local resources for collective action is likely 
to be higher in villages where the perception of land degradation is high. The effect 
of these indices on the selected poverty and natural resource outcomes of collective 
action will be investigated in the following sections. 
Indicators for success of collective action  
In this section we discuss the results from analyses of indicators for effectiveness or 
success of collective action. We present findings for changes in natural resource 
conditions and various quantitative indicators of performance defining changes in 
poverty and welfare conditions of the community. Using the rule of thumb of Eigen 
values>1, only one factor is retained. The factor loadings for this factor on the eight 
indicators capturing the outcomes related to improvements in natural resource 
conditions are presented in Table 6. The factor loadings are strongest for the 
community tube wells and open wells maintained in good condition through 
watershed investments. In the next stage we use factor analyses to develop an 
aggregate index for these indicators. The aggregate index (Perf-index-I) of the 
improvements in the condition of natural resources assets of the community is 
depicted in Figure 3. The plot for the performance scores of the watershed 
communities shows that the level of success in terms of these indicators is 
generally low. The distribution is generally concentrated around zero (but skewed 
to the left) indicating that most of the watersheds did not perform well on this 
index. Those with a score index greater than or equal to 1 are about 10 percent. 
These are those who are the best performing watersheds using this index.  
 
 
20 
Figure 3. Percentage distribution of performance index I: NRM indicators 
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Table 6. Scoring coefficients for indicator of improved management of 
natural resources 
Variable Scoring coefficient 
Communal tube wells in good condition 0.48505 
Communal open wells in good condition 0.45743 
Communal check-dams in good condition 0.03230 
Communal ponds in good condition -0.02063 
Communal tanks in good condition -0.02016 
Plantation and managed forest (established 
through collective action)  
-0.00528 
Treated communal land (%) -0.00423 
Treated private land (%) -0.00703 
Eigen value 1.47 
 
In addition to improvements in community natural resources, we also 
identified seven indicators measuring the changes in asset ownership and poverty 
conditions in the community. These are changes between conditions before and 
after the implementation of the watershed project that the key informants consider 
to be closely related to or attributable to the watershed project itself. As in the 
previous case, only one factor had Eigen values>1. The factor loadings for the 
selected indicators are presented in Table 7. Almost all the indicators have higher 
factor loadings towards an aggregate index (Perf-index-II) measuring the potential 
impact of collective action in improving asset endowments and welfare conditions in 
the community. The distribution of watershed villages using this index is presented 
in Figure 4. Unlike the previous performance index (Perf-index-I), this index is 
skewed towards the right, indicating that some watersheds have done generally 
well in improving the welfare and poverty conditions in the villages. However, 
similar to Perf-index-I, there are only very few communities with high levels of 
performance. About 10 percent of the watershed communities had performance 
scores greater than or equal to one.6 This is also consistent with our findings (see 
above) on the level of collective action. The next question is to examine whether 
these changes in natural resource and livelihood conditions in the community are 
actually correlated with the levels of collective action assessed earlier. 
                                                     
 
6 There are two watersheds that seem to be outliers in their performance index. In Figure 3, the 
outlier in terms of improved natural resources is Kothapally—a more successful watershed village in 
Rangareddy district. In Figure 4, this was Bandarlapally watershed in Ananthapur district, a much less 
successful watershed in terms of poverty impacts. However, the performance scores for these 
watersheds do not show unique patterns if one uses the collective action indices (Figure 1 and 2).  
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Figure 4. Percentage distribution of performance index II: poverty and 
asset indicators 
 
Table 7. Scoring coefficients for index of changes in asset ownership and 
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Variables Factor 1oadings 
Increase in livestock ownership 0.52130 
Decrease in landlessness -0.16005 
Increase in staple food self-sufficiency 0.40280 
Reduction in poverty 0.54610 
Improvement in food security 0.19959 
Reduction in seasonal migration 0.70309 
Reduction in permanent out-migration 0.69029 
Eigen value 1.77 
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improvements in poverty and environmental conditions in the watershed). 
Notwithstanding the measurement and valuation problems, if such relationships 
cannot be established empirically, there will be limited justification for individual 
households to participate in collective action in watershed programs. Along with the 
indices measuring the degree of collective action in each community, we included 
several variables that were hypothesized to capture observed differences within the 
watershed communities and influence the performance of community watershed 
activities. However, there was some concern whether unobserved factors that 
determine the index of institutional capacity and index of mobilization capacity also 
affect the measures of success of collective action. This would imply that IMC and 
IIC variables will be correlated with the error terms in the performance regressions, 
making OLS parameter estimates inconsistent. In order to test this potential effect 
of endogeneity bias, we used an instrumental variables approach to see whether 
appropriate instruments can be identified. The validity of this approach, however, 
depends on whether suitable instrumental variables—exogenous variables that are 
good predictors of the IIC and IMC variables but that are valid to exclude from the 
second stage regressions for success of collective action—can be identified. We 
started with a full OLS regression to isolate some variables that may be jointly 
insignificant in the separate performance regressions for both Perf-index-I and II. 
This has allowed us identify some instrumental variables that could be safely 
excluded from the performance regressions but could be used for predicting the 
potentially endogenous IMC and IIC variables. 7 We also test for over-identifying 
restrictions to examine the overall relevance of these instruments in the two-stage 
estimation process. The results are presented below. 
Effects on watershed natural resource conditions 
The determinants of the success of collective action measured in terms of 
improvements on natural resource base estimated using both OLS and instrumental 
variables methods are presented in Table 8. First, it is important to note that the 
Hausman test indicates that the null hypothesis of consistent OLS parameters 
cannot be rejected (Chi2 (3) = 2.51; P-value = 0.473). The identified instruments 
also passed the test for over-identifying restrictions (Sargan statistic: Chi-sq (4) = 
6.500; P-value = 0.165), indicating that the instruments are valid and are not 
correlated with the model error term. In order to check further as to why OLS 
remains consistent, we tested for endogeneity of IMC and IIC variables. The Wu-
Hausman endogeneity test (F(2,56) = 0.529; P-value = 0.592) indicated that the 
null hypothesis that the two indices are exogenous cannot be rejected. Based on 
these results, the OLS estimates are used in the subsequent discussion while the 
instrumental variables results are also shown for completeness. 
                                                     
 
7 The instruments identified for predicting IMC and IIC in the Perf-Index-I regressions include 
village area, distance to markets, distance to mandal, number of castes in village, share of common 
forest land in village, and whether the group displays and actively shares information about watershed 
activities. In the Perf-Index-II regression, the instruments identified were village area, distance to 
markets, number of castes in village, share of common forest land, share of degraded land in village 
area, number of permanently migrating households, seasonally migrating households, and highest 
school standard in the village.  
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Table 8. Determinants of success of collective action—Management of 
community natural resource investments8 
 Ordinary Least Squares Instrumental Variable Method 
Variables Coefficient St. Err Z-Stat. Coefficient St. Err Z-Stat. 
Index of institutional capacity 0.074 0.095 0.79 -0.123 0.215 -0.57 
Index of mobilization capacity 0.484 0.124 3.89*** 0.504 0.204** 2.47 
Project implementing agency 0.161 0.184 0.87 0.132 0.161 0.82 
Age of watershed 0.041 0.094 0.44 0.065 0.083 0.78 
Medium rainfall zone dummy 0.469 0.262 1.79* 0.480 0.235** 2.04 
High rainfall zone dummy 0.041 0.278 0.15 0.162 0.270 0.6 
Quality of road to village 0.460 0.177 2.6** 0.472 0.164*** 2.88 
Degree of conflict resolution 
problem 
-0.135 0.162 -0.83 -0.141 0.147 -0.96 
Degree of leadership problem 0.051 0.218 0.23 -0.045 0.194 -0.23 
Leader’s acceptability  0.191 0.300 0.64 0.421 0.293 1.43 
Degree of transparency in fund 
management 
-0.082 0.146 -0.56 -0.017 0.132 -0.13 
Minute reading in meetings 0.311 0.179 1.74* 0.261 0.171 1.52 
Share of backward caste -0.175 0.349 -0.5 -0.159 0.337 -0.47 
Share of forward caste 0.109 0.491 0.22 0.014 0.433 0.03 
Share of marginal and landless 
households 
-0.075 0.503 -0.15 -0.015 0.433 -0.03 
Share of households owning cattle 
before the project 
-0.004 0.005 -0.78 -0.005 0.004 -1.16 
Number of households -0.001 0.001 -1.02 -0.001 0.001 -1.11 
Number of seasonally migrating 
households before project 
-0.006 0.005 -1.24 -0.006 0.005 -1.24 
Number of permanently migrating 
households before project 
0.020 0.011 1.85* 0.021 0.009** 2.25 
Highest school standard in village 0.097 0.045 2.14** 0.097 0.040** 2.41 
Number of schools 0.025 0.113 0.22 0.045 0.104 0.43 
Households with phones before 
project 
-0.002 0.005 -0.32 0.000 0.004 0.02 
Households with electricity before 
project 
0.001 0.001 2.11** 0.001 0.001** 2.24 
Preference for female 
employment 
1.867 0.453 4.12*** 1.981 0.472*** 4.19 
Proportion of degraded land 23.832 16.734 1.42 23.228 14.773 1.57 
Proportion of rain-fed land 0.469 0.744 0.63 0.654 0.646 1.01 
Constant -2.882 1.587 -1.82* -3.295 1.406** -2.34 
R-Squared 0.68      
Adjusted R-Squared 0.54      
                                                     
 
8 *, **, *** indicate significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Hausman test (OLS is inconsistent 
under Ha, efficient under Ho) 
Chi2(3) = 2.51; P-value = 0.4728 
Wu-Hausman endogeneity test  
(Ho: Index 1 and Index 2 are 
exogenous)  
F(2,56) = 0.52915; P-value = 0.59202 
The significant (p-value <0.1) and positive correlates with this index include 
the internal mobilization capacity (IMC), medium rainfall zone, quality of the road 
linking the village, culture of reading minutes in meetings, number of permanently 
migrating households, highest school standard in the village, number of households 
using electricity before the project, and preference for female employment. Other 
included variables that proxied the problems of leadership and conflict management 
in watersheds were not significant. Only the reading of minutes from past meeting 
seems to have a positive effect on the natural resource performance index. Most 
notable in these results is the strong positive effect of collective action in terms of 
the internal mobilization capacity on this index (Perf-index-I). There seems to be 
little doubt that well-organized communities in terms of coordinating joint 
watershed activities and investments have been better able to manage the joint 
natural resource assets (wells, ponds, check-dams, forests, and grazing lands) of 
the community. Interestingly, better natural resource management is also 
positively correlated with the level of rainfall (highest gains being in the medium 
rainfall zone), the quality of the road, and access to education and electricity. The 
importance of the before project seasonal and permanent migration patterns seems 
to capture the severity of land degradation and water scarcity problems in the 
village that may stimulate greater determination by the community to change these 
outcomes and reverse the downward spiral. Well organized communities who 
perceive the threats to their current and future livelihoods are more likely to 
succeed in their collective efforts. Preference for female employment is also 
consistently significant in both the level of collective action and performance 
regressions, indicating the importance of distributional mechanisms for the success 
of watershed programs.  
Effects on household welfare and poverty 
This section presents the determinants of stated changes in the poverty levels and 
livelihood assets of households within the watershed communities. Before we 
present the results it would be useful to show the complexities involved in capturing 
the effect of collective natural resource investments on poverty. Whereas the effect 
of collective action on natural resource conditions is more direct, its ultimate 
influence on household welfare and poverty can be transmitted through direct and 
indirect pathways. The joint investments in improved natural resource management 
(such as wells, ponds, check-dams, forests, and grazing lands) will initially 
influence the condition and availability of water, soils, and woodlots. The effect on 
natural resource conditions may, however, also take time to have a measurable 
impact on the condition of the resource. Depending on the distribution of natural 
resource assets and the resource gestation period, improved natural resource 
conditions may ultimately translate into economically useful ecosystem services 
that improve household welfare and reduce rural poverty. This is an indirect effect. 
However, watershed interventions may also have components that affect livelihoods 
relatively immediately and more directly. This may include increased employment 
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opportunities for the poor that generate cash incomes and other associated 
watershed technologies (such as new crop varieties, improved application of 
fertilizers, fodder for animals, and so on.) that generate more immediate benefits to 
participating farmers. This can be considered a direct effect on household welfare. 
These direct and indirect effects are described in the schematic diagram in Figure 5. 
The statistical analysis undertaken here aims to capture these direct and indirect 
effects. 
Figure 5. Direct and indirect effects of collective action in watershed 
management 
As discussed earlier, the index for changes in the household asset ownership and 
poverty conditions (Perf-index-II) measures the outcomes of both the direct and 
indirect effects of collective action. In order to capture the indirect effect of natural 
resource investments, we use the changes in the natural resource conditions 
directly affected by the community watershed project. Any direct effect of collective 
action on changes in poverty and household livelihood assets is captured by 
including the IIC and IMC indices. In addition, other variables that were considered 
to influence the performance of watershed activities on poverty and livelihood 
assets were also included. However, as in the case of Perf-Index-I, we cannot rule 
out the possibility that unobservable factors that affect performance will also affect 
the indices of collective action (IMC and ICC). A similar approach of instrumental 
variables is used to test this potential endogeneity bias based on a full regression 
and jointly insignificant variables excluded from the performance regressions but 
used to instrument the potentially endogenous variables. The model specification 
tests are presented below. 
As in the case of Perf-Index-I, the Hausman test indicated that the OLS 
specification is consistent and there is much less to be gained from using the two-
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stage instrumental variables approach (see Table 9). The consistency of OLS 
parameters cannot be rejected (Chi2 (4) = 3.26; P-value = 0.515). However, the 
test for over identifying restrictions showed that the hypothesis of correlation with 
the error term could not be rejected (Sargan statistic Chi-sq (5)=13.465; P-value = 
0.019) – indicating that we could not find more appropriate instruments for the 
potentially endogenous variables. In order to check further as to why OLS remains 
consistent even when we lacked good instruments, we tested for endogeneity of 
IMC, IIC, and the index of changes in the condition of natural resources variables. 
The Wu-Hausman endogeneity test (F(3,55) = 0.212; P-value = 0.888) indicated 
that the null hypothesis that the collective action and natural resource indices in 
this specification are exogenous cannot be rejected. Hence, we mainly present our 
discussions in relation to the consistent and efficient OLS results. 
The variables with significant positive effects include quality of the road to 
the village, degree of information sharing and dissemination about the watershed 
project, level of access to telephones before the project, access to education in the 
villages, and preference for female employment. The significant and negative 
correlates include distance to Hyderabad and to the local administration (mandal), 
population share of the upper caste households, number of households with access 
to electricity before the project, and the overall size of the group (number of 
households). Most importantly, we could not find any of the collective action 
variables to have any significant effect on the changes in livelihood assets and 
poverty conditions in the community. Neither did we find any significant indirect 
effect of changes in natural resource conditions on the changes in poverty and 
livelihood assets in the community. However, this does not imply that the 
watershed projects did not generate any economic benefits to the community. It 
only implies that effect of any such outcomes on the poor and landless members 
was limited. The evidence of preference for female employment on poverty and 
livelihood assets indicates that communities with better distributional arrangements 
for reaching out to the less-privileged sections of the community will have a 
positive effect on poverty.  
The negative effect of some of the variables like access to electricity and the 
share of the forward caste in the community are not immediately clear. Access to 
electricity is directly associated with better off households and large farmers owning 
private tube wells for irrigation. In Andhra Pradesh, electricity is largely subsidized 
by the government, and the irrigation water pumping costs to farmers who own 
tube wells are very minimal. The negative effect of well ownership (related to farm-
level access to electricity) and the share of the forward caste in the community may 
therefore reflect the difficulties in designing meaningful institutions for collective 
action when access to and control over certain common watershed resources is not 
equitable (Deshpande and Reddy, 1991). Large farmers owning tube wells and 
those who have the upper hand in benefiting from common resources are likely to 
have higher interest to maintain the status quo, hence reducing the poverty 
impacts of collective action (Reddy and Shiferaw, 2007). Most of these effects seem 
to capture the effect of equity in sharing the benefits of collective action, indicating 
that the larger the proportion of the relatively better-off groups within the 
community, the lesser the chances for watershed collective action to improve 
conditions for the poor and marginal households. 
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Table 9. Determinants of success of collective action—changes in asset 
endowments and poverty indicators  
 Ordinary Least Squares Instrumental Variable Method 
Variables Coefficient St. 
Err 
Z-Stat. Coefficient St. 
Err 
Z-Stat 
Index of institutional capacity -0.129 0.091 -1.41 -0.219 0.200 -1.09 
Index of mobilization capacity -0.098 0.138 -0.71 -0.234 0.253 -0.92 
Index of changes in natural resources -0.130 0.124 -1.05 -0.049 0.207 -0.24 
Project implementing agency -0.166 0.167 -0.99 -0.227 0.148 -1.53 
Age of watershed 0.099 0.088 1.13 0.133 0.077 1.72 
Medium rainfall zone dummy -0.006 0.408 -0.02 -0.089 0.414 -0.21 
High rainfall zone dummy 0.026 0.262 0.10 0.008 0.249 0.03 
Quality of road to village 0.429 0.177 2.42** 0.396 0.173 2.28** 
Distance to mandal (km) -0.017 0.009 -1.92* -0.020 0.008 -2.42** 
Distance to Hyderabad (km) -0.003 0.001 -1.95* -0.003 0.001 -2.13** 
Degree of conflict resolution problem 0.154 0.154 1.00 0.107 0.148 0.73 
Degree of leadership problem -0.287 0.216 -1.33 -0.382 0.192 -1.99* 
Leader’s acceptability  0.345 0.289 1.20 0.473 0.289 1.64 
Degree of transparency in fund 
management 
0.089 0.135 0.66 0.151 0.118 1.28 
Minute reading in meetings  -0.053 0.165 -0.32 -0.065 0.147 -0.44 
Information dissemination  0.577 0.240 2.4** 0.593 0.246 2.41** 
Preference for female employment  1.231 0.505 2.44** 1.209 0.646 1.87* 
Share of backward caste -0.176 0.316 -0.56 -0.072 0.289 -0.25 
Share of forward caste -1.363 0.467 -2.92*** -1.420 0.416 -3.42*** 
Share of marginal and landless 
households 
0.395 0.447 0.88 0.505 0.380 1.33 
Number of households -0.002 0.001 -3.49*** -0.002 0.001 -3.35*** 
Number of schools 0.217 0.108 2.00** 0.277 0.099 2.79*** 
Households with phones before project 0.011 0.003 3.35*** 0.012 0.004 2.94*** 
Households with electricity before project -0.002 0.001 -3.27*** -0.002 0.001 -3.64*** 
Households owning cattle before the 
project 
-0.006 0.004 -1.36 -0.006 0.004 -1.76 
Constant -0.303 1.184 -0.26 -0.239 1.128 -0.21 
Number of observations 85      
R squared 0.67      
R squared adjusted 0.53      
Hausman test (OLS is inconsistent under 
Ha, efficient under Ho) 
Chi2(4) = 3.26; P-value = 0.5150 
Wu-Hausman endogeneity test  
(Ho: Index 1 and Index 2 are 
exogenous)  
F(3,55) = 0.21182; P-value = 0.88779 
 
The insignificant direct and indirect effect of collective action on poverty and 
improvements in household welfare may be attributable to many factors. First, the 
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effect of collective action may take many years to have any visible impact on 
poverty. This is a major attribute of natural resource investments that often require 
a longer gestation period to generate income gains to the resource users. Second, 
the poorest households often lack access and control over some of the most 
important productive assets (for example, irrigation water, pastures, and so on) 
and may not directly benefit from investments that use land and water as the main 
entry points. In one of the districts covered in this study, Reddy (Reddy et al., 
2004b) found that over 80 percent of the tube and open wells for irrigation were 
owned and controlled by the large farmers (farm size >10 acres). Second, the 
transmission of effects from improved natural resource conditions to productivity 
increases may involve a significant time lag and may not be realized within a period 
of 4-5 years (the common time span for completion of watershed projects studied 
here). In the watersheds covered under this study, limited benefits seem to have 
trickled down to the landless. Only 11.5 percent of the watersheds have any special 
provisions for increasing the welfare of the poor and landless households. A very 
limited number of the watersheds, 2.3 percent have reported that the landless 
benefited from using check-dams in the watersheds (see Table 10). However, most 
of the watersheds (92 percent) indicated that the poor and landless farmers had 
benefited from increased availability of temporary employment opportunities 
through the watershed development programs. While the lack of direct or indirect 
evidence of the effect of collective action on changes in poverty levels shows that 
the impacts on the poorest groups is minimal, it does not imply that income levels 
have not increased. Rather, the distribution of income growth does not seem to 
favor the poor. More analysis on this will be carried out in the future using the 
household data collected from these villages. 
Table 10. Percentage of watershed communities (n=87) reporting benefits 
for the landless 
Variables Percent Std. Err. 
Benefits from check-dams 2.3 0.151 
Benefits from common woodland 58.6 0.495 
Benefits from common grazing land 64.4 0.482 
Employment during the project 92.0 0.274 
Special provisions to the landless 11.5 0.321 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Rain-fed areas in the semi-arid tropics are characterized by low and erratic rainfall, 
poor soils, high levels of agro-ecosystem degradation, and pervasive poverty. India 
is one of the countries in South Asia that has adopted micro-watershed 
development as a strategy for poverty reduction and sustainable rural development 
in dry land areas. Some studies have shown that integrated watershed 
management interventions that also include improved access to markets and 
agricultural innovations are useful strategies for reducing poverty, improving 
livelihood resilience, and sustainability in these less-favored areas (Joshi et al., 
2004a,b; Reddy et al., 2004b). However, results from our analysis show that this 
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approach cannot succeed without collective action and coordination of resource use 
decisions by several actors and communities at the landscape level. The real 
benefits of watershed programs in terms of improving livelihoods, reducing poverty, 
and enhancing sustainable intensification of agro-ecosystems will critically depend 
on participation of resource users in community collective action. Whereas 
individual farmers often lack the capability and the incentive to improve local public 
goods, local institutions for collective action can help internalize externalities and 
reduce transaction costs for management of local commons. This contributes 
towards the empowerment of communities and facilitates joint investments for 
improving productivity and resource use sustainability at the landscape level.  
Using empirical data from 87 watershed communities in semi-arid India, this 
study has shown that collective action in watershed management can be captured 
through a set of variables that indicate the capacity of communities to design and 
enforce certain common institutional arrangements, and their ability to mobilize 
local financial and labor resources for watershed investments. The level of collective 
action in terms of internal institutional capacity was affected negatively by the size 
of the groups (number of households and area of the village) while distance from 
markets and high rainfall seem to increase it. On the other hand, collective action in 
term of internal mobilization capacity decreased with rainfall, size of the group, 
number of seasonal migrants, and distance from the seat of the local 
administration, but increased with area of the village, flow of information within the 
village, and the share of land under village commons. The mobilization capacity also 
seems to increase with equitable distribution of benefits and preference given for 
employment of the rural poor and female workers. However, the results clearly 
show that in most watershed communities the level of collective action is very 
limited, indicating that only few communities have achieved higher active 
participation of resource users in watershed programs. 
At the same time, we also found only few (10-15 percent) watersheds that 
were able to significantly harness the potential of collective action to achieve 
desired economic and environmental objectives. There is a strong correlation 
between higher levels of collective action and higher performance of communities in 
facilitating resource improving investments, especially water-harvesting structures 
and good management of these resources. The effectiveness of watershed groups 
in terms of their performance on this index depended on other variables like 
rainfall, access to education and other social services, governance structures in 
terms of conduct of meeting and proper archiving of information, resource 
degradation or scarcity problems (captured through degree of out-migration), and 
the quality of the road linking the village. On the other hand, the correlation 
between higher collective action and changes in the index of poverty parameters 
was not statistically significant. The analyses also showed that changes in 
watershed natural resource stocks did not have a significant effect on changes in 
household welfare, indicating that the indirect effects of collective action on the 
poorest segments of the community are still limited. This offers evidence that the 
links between collective action and poverty are not always straightforward as 
distribution of rights and other factors will condition how effectively the poor will be 
able to benefit from improved natural resource conditions within the watershed. 
Overall, the results indicate that collective action has made a significant 
contribution in terms of improving the investment and management of critical 
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jointly held natural resource assets (such as wells, check-dams, community forests, 
grazing land, and so on), but there is lack of evidence on its effects on improving 
the asset endowments of the resource poor and reducing poverty levels within the 
semi-arid watershed villages included in this study. In order to improve active 
participation of the resource users and the poverty impacts of watershed programs, 
there is a need to promote pro-poor interventions and institutional arrangements 
that enhance equitable sharing of both costs and benefits. Much less is also known 
about the emergence of effective local institutions for watershed collective action 
and how such institutions adapt during the post-project phase and influence the 
propensity for sustainable community management of local investments. Without 
effective and adaptable local institutions, the long-term sustainability of watershed 
investments will remain one of the key lingering questions. Future studies would 
need to investigate these factors and offer new insights on how preexisting 
proclivity for collective action and differences in biophysical and market conditions, 
and national and provincial policies may shape the process and determine the 
outcomes and impacts of watershed programs.  
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